Chapter I
The Opening Of Hostilities, 1775
The Americans of the eighteenth century were notably a maritime people and no better sailors were to be found. The British colonies were close to the sea, and were distant from each other, scattered along a coast line of more than a thousand miles; so that, in the absence of good roads, intercommunication was almost altogether by water. The ocean trade also, chiefly with England and the West Indies, was extensive. Fishing was one of the most important industries, especially of the northeastern colonies, and the handling of small vessels on the Banks of Newfoundland at all seasons of the year trained large numbers of men in seamanship. The whale fishery likewise furnished an unsurpassed school for mariners.

A considerable proportion of the colonists, therefore, were at home upon the sea, and more than this they were to some extent practiced in maritime warfare. England, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was at war with various foreign nations a great part of the time, and almost from the beginning of the colonial period American privateers and letters of marque scoured the ocean in search of French or Spanish prizes. Large fleets were fitted out and manned by provincials for the expedition under Phips against Quebec in 1690 and for Pepperrell's successful descent upon Louisburg in 1745. Privateering during the French and Indian War of 1754 furnished a profitable field for American enterprise and gave to many seamen an experience which proved of service twenty years later. Even in times of peace the prevalence of piracy necessitated vigilance, and nearly every merchantman was armed and prepared for resistance (See Weeden's Economic and Social History of New England, chs. v, ix, xiv, xvi; and Atlantic Monthly, September and October, 1861, for journal of Captain Norton of Newport, 1741. See Appendix I for authorities.)

It would seem, then, that American seamen at the opening of the Revolution had the training and experience which made them the best sort of raw material for an efficient naval force. The lack of true naval tradition, however, and of military discipline, and the poverty of the country, imposed limitations which, together with the overwhelming force of the enemy, seriously restricted the field of enterprise. Nevertheless, the patriotic cause was greatly aided and independence made possible by the activities of armed men afloat.

The navigation laws of Great Britain were naturally unpopular in the colonies, and their stricter enforcement after the peace of 1763, together with the imposition of new customs duties, led to almost universal efforts to evade them. In 1764 the British schooner St. John was fired upon by Rhode Islanders, and in 1769 the armed sloop Liberty, engaged in the suppression of smuggling, made herself so obnoxious to the people of Newport that they seized and burned her. In 1772 the schooner Gaspee, on similar duty, was stationed in Narragansett Bay and caused great annoyance by stopping and examining all vessels. The people were exasperated at the arrogant behavior of her commander, who in many cases exceeded his authority. On the 9th of June, as the Gaspee was chasing a vessel bound from Newport to Providence, she ran aground about seven miles from Providence; she was hard and fast and the tide was ebbing. After nightfall a party of men in boats descended the river from Providence and attacked the schooner. After a short contest, in which the commanding officer of the Gaspee was wounded, she was captured. The prisoners and everything of value having been removed, she was set on fire and in a few hours blew up. Little effort was made to conduct this affair secretly, and yet in spite of the diligent inquiry of a court of five commissioners, all of whom were in sympathy with the British ministry, no credible evidence could be adduced implicating any person; showing a practical unanimity of feeling in the colony (R. I. Colony Records, vi, 427-430, vii, 55-192; Bartlett's Destruction of the Gaspee; Staple's Destruction of the Gaspee; Channing's United States, iii, 124-127, 151.)

The first public service afloat, under Revolutionary authority, was perhaps the voyage of the schooner Quero, of Salem, Captain John Derby, despatched to England by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress with the news of the Battle of Lexington. She sailed April 29, 1775, some days later than General Gage's official despatches and arrived at her destination nearly two weeks ahead of them (Essex Institute Collections, January, 1900; Century Magazine, September, 1899.)

Early in May, 1775, the British sloop of war Falcon of sixteen guns, Captain John Linzee, seized two American sloops in Vineyard Sound; "on which the People fitted out two Vessels, went in Pursuit of them, retook and brought them both into a Harbour, and sent the Prisoners to Taunton Gaol." (New England Chronicle, May 18, 1775; American Archives, Series IV, ii, 608.)

The islands in Boston Harbor had long been used by the colonists for pasturage and were well stocked with cattle and sheep which the British troops in the town took measures to secure for their consumption. Soon after the battle of Lexington they succeeded in carrying off all the livestock on Governor's and Thompson's Islands. The Americans, May 27, with the intention of forestalling similar raids, landed between two and three hundred men on Hog Island who attempted to bring off the cattle and sheep, while a detachment of about thirty men crossed over to Noddle's Island (East Boston) for the same purpose, when "about a hundred Regulars landed upon the last mentioned and pursued our Men till they had got safely back to Hog Island; then the Regulars began to fire very briskly by Platoons upon our Men. In the mean time an armed Schooner with a Number of Barges came up to Hog Island to prevent our People's leaving said Island, which she could not effect; after that several Barges were towing her back to her Station, as there was little Wind and flood Tide. Our People put in a heavy Fire of small Arms upon the Barges, and two 3 Pounders coming up to our Assistance began to play upon them and soon obliged the Barges to quit her and to carry off her Crew; After which our people set Fire to her, although the Barges exerted themselves very vigorously to prevent it. She was burnt [the next day] upon the Way of Winisimet Ferry. We have not lost a single Life, although the Engagement was very warm from the armed Schooner (which mounted four 6 Pounders and 12 swivels), from an armed Sloop that lay within Reach of Small Arms, from one or two 12 Pounders upon Noddle's Island, and from the Barges which were all fixed with swivels." (Boston Gazette, June 5,1775.) The American loss was four wounded, one of whom died two days later; that of the British was said to be twenty killed and fifty wounded. The stock, amounting to over four hundred sheep, about thirty cattle and some horses, were brought away by the provincials. During the siege of Boston various other attempts, successful and unsuccessful, were made to bring away live stock from the islands of the harbor, thereby reducing the possible sources of food supply of the British shut up in the town (Sumner's History of East Boston, 367-389; Frothingham's Siege of Boston, 108, 109, 225; Green's Three Military Diaries, 86; Almon's Remembrancer, i, 112; Amer. Archives, IV, ii, 719; Boston Gazette, June 5, 1775; N. E. Chronicle, May 25, June 15, July 27, October 5, 1775.)

Josiah Quincy in a letter to John Adams, dated September 22, 1775, proposed a plan for making the investment of Boston complete and so forcing the capitulation of the besieged British army. His proposal was to build five forts, three of them on Long Island, so placed as to command the channels of the harbor, including the narrows which were guarded by the enemy's men-of-war in Nantasket Roads; these ships could be driven out by the fire of the forts. He would then sink hulks in the narrows. No ships could thenceforth pass in or out and "both Seamen and Soldiers, if they don't escape by a timely Flight, must become Prisoners at Discretion." Quincy also thought that "Row Gallies must be our first mode of Defence by Sea." (Adams MSS.)

Near the eastern frontier of Maine, in a situation most exposed to British attack, lay the little seaport of Machias. The one staple of the town was lumber, and this the inhabitants exchanged at Boston for the various supplies they needed. In the spring of 1775 food was scarce, for the previous year's crops had failed. Consequently a petition, dated May 25, was sent to the General Court or Provincial Congress of Massachusetts at Watertown, begging for provisions and promising to send back lumber in return. News of the fight at Lexington and Concord had lately reached Machias and had stirred the patriotism of the people, who in spite of their isolated position, were in the main devoted to the provincial cause and had their committee of safety and correspondence. A committee of the General Court reported June 7 in favor of sending the provisions. Meanwhile Captain Ichabod Jones, a merchant engaged in trade with Machias, had proceeded from Boston to that place with two sloops, the Unity and the Polly, loaded with provisions and escorted by the armed schooner Margaretta under the command of Midshipman Moore of the British navy. They arrived June 2 and Jones took measures to procure a return cargo of lumber for the use of the British troops in Boston. As the only means of obtaining the much needed provisions it was voted in town meeting, notwithstanding the opposition of a large minority of staunch patriots, to allow Jones to take his lumber. He proceeded accordingly to distribute the provisions, but to those only who had voted in his favor. The patriots, under the lead of Benjamin Foster and Jeremiah O'Brien, were determined to prevent the shipping of the lumber to Boston. On Sunday, June 11, an unsuccessful attempt was made to capture Jones and the officers of the Margaretta while at church. They took the alarm and Jones fled to the woods, where he was taken some days later; the officers escaped to their vessel. Moore then threatened to bombard the town (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., vi (April, 1895), 124-130.)

"Upon this a party of our men went directly to stripping the sloop [Unity] that lay at the wharf and another party went off to take possession of the other sloop which lay below & brought her up nigh a wharf & anchored in the stream. The Tender [Margaretta] did not fire, but weighed her anchors as privately as possible and in the dusk of the evening fell down & came to within musket shot of the sloop, which obliged our people to slip their cable & run the sloop aground. In the meantime a considerable number of our people went down in boats & canoes, lined the shore directly opposite to the Tender, & having demanded her to surrender to America, received for answer, 'fire & be damn'd'; they immediately fired in upon her, which she returned and a smart engagement ensued. The Tender at last slipped her cable & fell down to a small sloop commanded by Capt. Tobey & lashed herself to her for the remainder of the night. In the morning of the 12th she took Capt. Tobey out of his vessel for a pilot & made all the sail they could to get off, as the wind & tide favored; but having carried away her main boom and meeting with a sloop from the Bay of Fundy, they came to, robbed the sloop of her boom & gaff, took almost all her provisions together with Mr. Robert Avery of Norwich in Connecticut, and proceeded on their voyage. Our people, seeing her go off in the morning, determined to follow her.

"About forty men armed with guns, swords, axes & pitch forks went in Capt. Jones's sloop under the command of Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien; about twenty, armed in the same manner & under the command of Capt. Benj. Foster, went in a small schooner. During the chase our people built them breastworks of pine boards and anything they could find in the vessels that would screen them from the enemy's fire. The Tender, upon the first appearance of our people, cut her boats from her stern & made all the sail she could, but being a very dull sailor they soon came up with her and a most obstinate engagement ensued, both sides being determined to conquer or die; but the Tender was obliged to yield, her Capt. was wounded in the breast with two balls, of which wounds he died next morning. Poor Mr. Avery was killed and one of the marines, and five wounded. Only one of our men was killed and six wounded, one of which is since dead of his wounds. The battle was fought at the entrance of our harbour & lasted for near the space of one hour. We have in our possession four double fortifyed three pounders & fourteen swivels and a number of small arms, which we took with the Tender, besides a very small quantity of ammunition."(Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., vi, 130, 131 (report of Machias Committee of Correspondence, June 14, 1775). Foster's schooner is said to have run aground and to have taken no part in the battle. The Unity returned to Machias with the Margaretta as her prize. O'Brien's five brothers were with him in this enterprise (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., 1847, January, 1891, April, 1895; New England Magazine, August, 1895; Massachusetts Magazine, April, 1910; Sherman's Life of Jeremiah O'Brien, chs. ii-v; Boston Gazette, July 3, 1775.)

Joseph Wheaton, one of the Unity's crew, wrote many years later a detailed account of the action. He says that the Margaretta, after having replaced her broken boom, "was Making Sail when our Vessel came in Sight; then commenced the chace, a Small lumber boat in pursuit of a well armed British vessel of war - in a Short time she cut away her three boats. Standing for sea while thus pursuing, we aranged our selves, appointed Jeremiah Obrien our conductor, John Steele to steer our Vessel, and in about two hours we received her first fire, but before we could reach her she had cut our rigging and Sails emmencely; but having gained to about one hundred yards, one Thomas Neight fired his wall piece, wounded the man at the helm and the Vessel broached too, when we nearly all fired. At this moment Captain Moore imployed himself at a box of hand granades and put two on board our Vessel, which through our crew into great disorder, they having killed and wounded nine men. Still two ranks which were near the prow got a second fire, when our bowsprit was run through the main shrouds of the Margarette and Sail, when Six of us Jumped on her quarter deck and, with clubed Muskets drove the crew from their quarters, from the waist into the hold of the Margarette; the Capt. lay mortally wounded, Robert Avery was killed and eight marines & Saylors lay dead on her deck, the Lieutenant wounded in her cabin. Thus ended this bloody affray." (Adams MSS., Wheaton to President Adams, February 21, 1801. See another account by Wheaton in Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., ii (January, 1891), 109.) Wheaton says that fourteen of the Americans were killed and wounded.

According to the British account the Americans attempted to board the Margaretta with boats and canoes during the night before the battle, but were beaten off. In the next day's chase Foster's schooner continued in company with the Unity to the end. As these vessels approached they were received by the Margaretta with a broadside of swivels, small arms, and hand grenades, but they both came alongside, the Unity on the starboard and the schooner on the larboard bow (British Admiralty Records, Admirals' Despatches 485, July 24, 1775, No. 2.)

The General Court of Massachusetts resolved, June 26, 1775: "That the thanks of this Congress be, and they are hereby given to Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien and Capt. Benjamin Foster and the other brave men under their command, for their courage and good conduct in taking one of the tenders belonging to our enemies and two sloops belonging to Ichabod Jones, and for preventing the ministerial troops being supplied with lumber; and that the said tender, sloops, their cargoes remain in the hands of the said captains O'Brien and Foster and the men under their command, for them to improve as they shall think most for their and the public advantage until the further action of this or some future Congress." (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., vi, 132.) The Unity was fitted out with the Margaretta's guns, renamed the Machias Liberty and put under Jeremiah O'Brien's command; she was presumably chosen as a cruiser in preference to the Margaretta, on account of her superior sailing qualities.

About a month after the capture of the Margaretta the British schooner Diligent, carrying eight or ten guns and fifty men, and the tender Tapnaquish, with sixteen swivels and twenty men (Wheaton (Adams MSS.) gives these vessels a smaller number of men and guns), appeared off Machias. The captain of the Diligent going ashore in his boat was seized by a small party of Americans stationed near the mouth of the bay and sent to Machias. Jeremiah O'Brien in the Machias Liberty and Benjamin Foster in another vessel were then sent down the river, found the British vessels and took them without firing a gun. According to Wheaton, O'Brien subsequently cruised in the Bay of Fundy and took a number of British merchant vessels (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., ii (1847), 246, ii (January, 1891), 111; Life of O'Brien, ch. vi; Massachusetts Mag., January, 1910.)

Foster and O'Brien were next sent by the Machias Committee of Safety to Watertown to report their exploits to the Provincial Congress. Under their charge went also the prisoners taken in the Margaretta, Diligent and Tapnaquish together with Ichabod Jones. They proceeded as far as Falmouth (Portland), a week's voyage, by water. The ruthless burning of Falmouth by the British under Captain Henry Mowatt several weeks later is supposed to have been, in part at least, an act of retaliation for the capture of the British vessels at Machias. The journey of O'Brien and Foster from Falmouth to Watertown was made by land and took about ten days. On August 11th the prisoners were delivered at Watertown by their captors, who about the same time reported also to General Washington at the headquarters of the army in Cambridge. They petitioned the Provincial Congress for the privilege of raising a company of men among themselves at the expense of the Province, to be used in the defense of Machias and to give occupation to numbers of young men who in the distress of war times were without means of support. They also asked that the officers of the Machias Liberty be given commissions and that men be stationed on board her, this vessel to be supplied and equipped and used for the defense of the town, which might easily be blockaded by a small force. The petitions were favorably received by the Congress and O'Brien was appointed to command both the Machias Liberty and the Diligent. These vessels were thereby taken into the service of the colony and became the nucleus of the Massachusetts navy. O'Brien soon returned to Machias in order to oversee the fltting out of his vessels (O'Brien, ch. vi; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 346, 354; Records of General Court of Massachusetts, August 21, 23,1775; Massachusetts Spy, August 16, 1775.)

Off Cape Ann, August 9, 1775, the British sloop of war Falcon, Captain Linzee, fell in with two schooners from the West Indies, bound to Salem. One of these schooners, says a report from Gloucester, was "soon brought to, the other taking advantage of a fair wind, put into our harbour, but Linzee having made a prize of the first, pursued the second into the harbour and brought the first with him. He anchored and sent two barges with fifteen men in each, armed with muskets and swivels; these were attended with a whale boat in which was the Lieutenant and six privates. Their orders were to seize the loaded schooner and bring her under the Falcon's bow. The Militia and other inhabitants were alarmed at this daring attempt and prepared for a vigorous opposition. The barge-men under the command of the Lieutenant boarded the schooner at the cabbin windows, which provoked a smart fire from our people on the shore, by which three of the enemy were killed and the Lieutenant wounded in the thigh, who thereupon returned to the man of war. Upon this Linzee sent the other schooner and a small cutter he had to attend him, well armed, with orders to fire upon the damn'd rebels wherever they could see them and that he would in the mean time cannonade the town; he immediately fired a broadside upon the thickest settlements and stood himself with diabolical pleasure to see what havock his cannon might make . . . Not a ball struck or wounded an individual person, although they went through our houses in almost every direction when filled with women and children . . . Our little party at the waterside performed wonders, for they soon made themselves masters of both the schooners, the cutter, the two barges, the boat, and every man in them, and all that pertained to them. In the action, which lasted several hours, we lost but one man, two others wounded, one of which is since dead, the other very slightly wounded. We took of the men of war's men thirty-five, several were wounded and one since dead; twenty-four were sent to head-quarters, the remainder, being impressed from this and the neighboring towns, were permitted to return to their friends." (Pennsylvania Packet, August 28, 1775; N. E. Chronicle, August 25, 1775.)

Captain Linzee, who makes the date of the affair August 8, states in his report to the admiral at Boston that having anchored in Gloucester harbor he "sent Lieut. Thornborough with the Pinnace, Long Boat and Jolly Boat, mann'd and arm'd in order to bring the Schooner out, the Master coming in from sea at the same time in a small tender, I directed him to go and assist the Lieutenant. When the Boats had passed a Point of Rocks that was between the Ship and Schooner, they received a heavy fire from the Rebels who were hidden behind Rocks and Houses, and behind Schooners aground at Wharfs, but notwithstanding the heavy fire from the Rebels, Lieut. Thornborough boarded the Schooner and was himself and three men wounded from Shore. On the Rebels firing on the Boats, I fired from the ship into the Town, to draw the Rebels from the Boats. I very soon observed the Rebels payed little attention to the firing from the ship and seeing their fire continued very heavy from the schooner the Lieutenant had boarded, I made an attempt to set fire to the Town." Hoping that by this means the attention of the Americans would be directed to saving their houses, so that the schooner could be brought off, Linzee sent a party ashore to fire the town; but the powder used for the purpose was set off prematurely, "one of the Men was blowed up," and the attempt failed. The town was then bombarded. "About 4 o'clock in the afternoon the lieutenant was brought on board under cover of the Masters' fire from the Schooner, who could not leave her. All the Boats were much damaged by the shots and lay on the side of the Schooner next to the Rebels; on my being acquainted with the situation of the Master, I sent the Prize Schooner to anchor ahead the Schooner the Master was in and veer alongside to take him and People away, who were very much exposed to the Rebels' fire, but from want of an officer to send her in, it was not performed, the Vessel not anchored properly." The master, despairing of succor, surrendered about seven in the evening "with the Gunner, fifteen Seamen, Seven Marines, one Boy, and ten prest Americans." The next morning the Falcon weighed anchor and proceeded to Nantasket Roads (Magazine of History, August, 1905.)

Several other affairs, of little importance in themselves, showed the readiness of the provincials for action upon the water at an early period, before there was naval organization of any kind to give authority to their acts (Boston Gazette, September 11, October 2, 9, 1775; Penn. Packet, September 4, 1775.) Boston being the seat of war at this time, most of the maritime events naturally took place in New England waters during the first year. As early as August, 1775, however, a South Carolina sloop, sent out by the Council of Safety, captured a British vessel on the Florida coast (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 180.)

The situation of affairs in America, as is well known, caused great concern in England for a considerable time before the actual outbreak of the rebellion. Of all the measures proposed by whig or tory for the adjustment of the difficulty, probably the wisest, for the conservation of the empire, was suggested by Viscount Barrington, the Secretary at War; but wisdom availed little with the British ministry of that day. Barrington's advice was given in a series of letters written in the years 1774 and 1775 to the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary for the Colonies (Political Life of William Wildman, Viscount Barrington, by his brother Shute (London, 1814), 140-152.) His opinion was that the colonies could not be subdued by the army, and that even if they could, the permanent occupation of America by a large force would be necessary, a source of constant exasperation to the colonists and of enormous expense to the government. The troops, he thought, should be withdrawn to Canada, Nova Scotia, and East Florida, and there quartered "till they can be employed with good effect elsewhere." The reduction of the rebellious colonies should be left to the navy. November 14, 1774, he writes: "The naval force may be so employed as must necessarily reduce the Colony [Massachusetts] to submission without shedding a drop of blood." (Ibid., 141.) A few weeks later, December 24, he goes a little more into detail. Speaking especially of New England he says: "Conquest by land is unnecessary, when the country can be reduced first by distress and then to obedience by our Marine totally interrupting all commerce and fishery, and even seizing all the ships in the ports, with very little expense and less bloodshed." As to the colonies south of New England, "a strict execution of the Act of Navigation and other restrictive laws would probably be sufficient at present." A few frigates and sloops could enforce those laws and prevent almost all commerce - "Though we must depend on our smaller ships for the active part of this plan, I think a squadron of ships of the line should be stationed in North America, both to prevent the intervention of foreign powers and any attempt of the Colonies to attack our smaller vessels by sea." "The Colonies will in a few months feel their distress; their spirits, not animated by any little successes on their part or violence of persecution on ours, will sink; they will be consequently inclined to treat, probably to submit to a certain degree." (Barrington, 144-147.) Concessions could then be made without loss of dignity, the mistake of imposing further obnoxious taxes being avoided. Barrington wrote on the same subject to Dartmouth the next year; and also to Lord North, August 8, 1775, saying: "My own opinion always has been and still is, that the Americans may be reduced by the fleet, but never can be by the army." (Ibid., 151)

Chapter II
Naval Administration And Organization
The events already related took place under the stress of circumstances, most of them unauthorized by Continental or Provincial Congress. It is now necessary to interrupt the narrative of naval operations in order to sketch briefly the various sources of authority and the administrative systems under which acted the different classes of vessels throughout the course of the war. These classes were: First, Continental vessels; second, the state navies; third, the privateers, commissioned either by the Continental government or by the various states, and in some cases by both (In the preparation of so much of this chapter as relates to the administration and organization of the American naval forms, Paullin's Navy of the American Revolution has been closely followed. See also Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1888-1904, 1917-1957; Works of John Adams, ii, 462-464, 469, 470, 479-484, iii, 6-12.)

Public vessels cruising under Continental authority comprised not only the Continental navy, strictly speaking, including vessels fitted out in France, but also the fleets organized by Washington in Massachusetts Bay in 1775 and later in New York; by Arnold on Lake Champlain in 1776 and by Pollock in 1778 on the Mississippi River.

General Washington took the first actual step towards placing a Continental force upon the sea by fitting out the schooner Hannah, which sailed from Beverly September 5, 1775, and returned to port two days later with a prize. An important measure in making effective the siege of Boston, then in progress, was the intercepting of supplies coming to the town by water; the supplies being at the same time of the utmost value to the American army investing the town. Before the end of the year seven other vessels, officered and manned from the army, were fitted out by Washington. The next year he organized a similar but smaller fleet at New York (see next chapter.)

The first official suggestion of a Continental navy came from the Assembly of Rhode Island which, August 26, 1775, declared "that the building and equipping an American fleet, as soon as possible, would greatly and essentially conduce to the preservation of the lives, liberty and property of the good people of these colonies," and instructed the delegates from that province in the Continental Congress "to use their whole influence at the ensuing congress for building at the Continental expence a fleet of sufficient force for the protection of these colonies." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 231.) The Rhode Island delegates presented their instructions to Congress October 3 and this brought the matter fairly before that body. Discussion of these instructions was postponed from time to time and it was several weeks before definite action was taken on them. Meanwhile intelligence had been received of the sailing from England of two brigs laden with military supplies bound to Quebec. The practicability of intercepting these vessels was considered in Congress October 5. Strong opposition was developed on the part of a vociferous minority to any participation of the Continental government in maritime warfare; to them it appeared sheer madness to send ships out upon the sea to meet the overwhelming naval force of England. After a lively debate the matter was referred to a committee consisting of John Adams, John Langdon, and Silas Deane. Upon the recommendation of this committee it was decided to instruct Washington at once to procure two Massachusetts cruisers for that service and to request the cooperation of the governors of Rhode Island and Connecticut (Journals of Continental Congress, October 3, 5, 1775; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 950, 1038, 1888-1890.)

Elbridge Gerry wrote from Watertown, October 9, 1775, to Samuel Adams, then a member of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, saying: "If the Continent should fit out a heavy ship or two and increase them as circumstances shall admit, the Colonies large privateers, and individuals small ones, surely we may soon expect to see the coast clear of cutters." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 993.)

On the advice of the committee appointed October 5, Congress voted on the 13th to fit out two vessels, one of them to carry ten guns, to cruise three months to the eastward in the hope of intercepting British transports. Another committee of three was appointed to inquire into the expense. October 30, 1775, is an important date in naval legislation. Congress resolved to arm the second of the vessels already provided for with fourteen guns and also authorized two additional vessels which might carry as many as twenty and thirty-six guns respectively, "for the protection and defence of the United Colonies." By this vote Congress was fully committed to the policy of maintaining a naval armament. On the same day a committee of seven was formed by adding four members to those already appointed (Jour. Cont. Congr., October 6, 7, 13,17, 30, 1775.) This committee was the first executive body for the management of naval affairs. It was known as the Naval Committee and the members were John Langdon of New Hampshire, John Adams of Massachusetts, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, Silas Deane of Connecticut, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina.

During the closing months of 1775 much legislation necessary for the organization of the navy was enacted by Congress on the recommendation of the Naval Committee. In the beginning there was strong opposition to all enterprises of a naval character, but it gradually broke down before the arguments of the more far-sighted and reasonable members. November 10 the Marine Corps was established. On the 25th captures of British ships of war, transports, and supply vessels were authorized and the several colonies were advised to set up prize courts. The apportionment of the shares in prizes was prescribed. In the case of privateers all the proceeds went to the owners and captors; in the case of Continental or colony cruisers two thirds of the value of a prize when a transport or supply vessel, one half when a vessel of war, went to the government, while the captors took the rest. November 28, "Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies" (See Appendix II) were adopted. These early navy regulations were brief, relating chiefly to discipline and prescribing the ration and pay. The rules provided for courts martial, but not for courts of inquiry; there was much subsequent legislation on the subject of naval courts. Pensions for permanent disability and bounties, to be awarded in certain cases, were provided for, the necessary funds for which were to be set apart from the proceeds of prizes. The rules of November 28 were framed by John Adams and were based on British regulations. Adams was a leader in all this early legislation and the part he took in the founding of the Revolutionary navy was important and influential (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 10, 17, 23, 24, 25, 28, 1775; Adams's Works, iii, 7-11; Am. Arch., IV, v, 1111.)

In November the Naval Committee purchased four merchant vessels under the provisions of October 13 and 30, to be converted into men-of-war. These vessels, as named by the committee, were the ships Alfred and Columbus and the brigs Cabot and Andrew Doria. The first was named in honor of the supposed founder of the English navy, the second and third for famous discoverers, and the fourth for the great Genoese admiral. Other vessels were authorized and purchased from time to time, the first of which was a sloop called the Providence (Adams, iii, 12; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1938; .Jour. Cont. Congr., December 2, 1775.)

Definite action was taken in Congress on the Rhode Island instructions December 11, when a committee of twelve was "appointed to devise ways and means for furnishing these colonies with a naval armament." Two days later this committee "brought in their report, which being read and debated was agreed to as follows: That five ships of thirty-two guns, five of twenty-eight guns, three of twenty-four guns, making in the whole thirteen, can be fitted for the sea probably by the last of March next, viz: in New Hampshire one, in Massachusetts Bay two, in Connecticut one, in Rhode Island two, in New York two, in Pennsylvania four, and in Maryland one. That the cost of these ships so fitted will not be more than 66,666 2/3 dollars each on the average, allowing two complete suits of sails for each ship, equal in the whole to 866,666 2/3 dollars."

Of these frigates, the Raleigh, of 32 guns, was built at Portsmouth, New Hampshire; the Hancock, 32, and the Boston, 24, at Salisbury and Newburyport on the Merrimac River; the Warren, 32, and the Providence, 28, at Providence; the Trumbull, 28, at Chatham on the Connecticut River; the Montgomery, 28, and the Congress, 24, at Poughkeepsie on the Hudson River; the Randolph, 32, Washington, 32, Effingham, 28, and Delaware, 24, at or near Philadelphia on the Delaware River; and the Virginia, 28, at Baltimore. The actual number of guns on a ship was generally in excess of the rate; a thirty-two gun frigate commonly carried about thirty-six guns. With a few exceptions these frigates were armed with no guns heavier than twelve-pounders. The smaller vessels of the Revolutionary navy carried only four and six-pounders. All were long guns; the light, short, large-calibre guns called carronades had not yet come into general use. Some vessels carried a secondary battery, mounted on deck or in the tops, of small light mortars called coehorns or of swivels, which were light guns mounted on pivots. December 13, 1775, the day when these thirteen frigates were provided for, is another important date in the early history of the navy. On the 14th a committee of thirteen was chosen by ballot to superintend the construction and equipment of the frigates (Jour. Cont. Congr., December 11, 13, 14, 1775. See Appendix V.)

From descriptions of three of these frigates, furnished nearly two years later to Admiral Howe, commanding the British fleet on the North American station, we are able to get an idea of their appearance and dimensions. The Hancock is describedas follows, beginning with the figure head: "A Man's Head with Yellow Breeches, white Stockings, Blue Coat with Yellow Button Holes, small cocked Hat with a Yellow Lace, has a Mast in lieu of an Ensign Staff with a Latteen Sail on it, has a Fore and Aft Driver Boom, with another across, Two Top Gallant Royal Masts, Pole mizen topmast, a whole Mizen Yard and mounts 32 Guns, has a Rattle Snake carved on the Stern, Netting all around the Ship, Stern Black and Yellow, Quarter Galleries all Yellow." "Principal Dimensions of the Rebel Frigate Hancock. Length on the upper Deck, 140 ft. 8 ins. Breadth on Do. 30.2. Length of Keel for Tonnage, 116.2 3/4. Extreme Breadth, 35.2. Depth in the Hold, 10.7. Burthen in Tons, 764. Heigth between Decks, 5.6. Do. in the Waste, 5.0. Size of the Gun Ports, fore & aft, 2.7. up & down, 2.2. Length on the Quarter Deck, 57.8. Length on the Forecastle, 31.3. Draught of Water, afore, 14.0, abaft, 15.10. Heigth of the Ports from the Surface of the Water, Forward, 9.0, Midships, 8.2, Abaft, 9.2." Then the Boston: "An IndianHead with a Bow and Arrow in the Hand, painted White, Red and Yellow, Two top gallant Royal Masts, Pole mizen topmast on which she hoists a Top gallant Sail, painted nearly like the Hancock with Netting all round, has a Garf, a Mast in room of an Ensign Staff with a Latteen Sail on it, and mounts 30 guns." "Dimensions of the Armed Ship named the Delaware...Length on the Gun Deck, 121 Feet; Keel for Tonnage, 96; Extreme Breadth, 32.6. The Ship lately built, Mounts twenty four Guns on the Upper Deck; And when furnished with proper Artillery, capable of carrying twelve Pounders with great facility." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Adm. Desp. 487, August 28, 1777, nos. 7 and 8; A. D. 488, November 23, 1777, no. 3.) The figures for the Warren and Providence, from the journal of the committee in charge of building those ships, are: length on the gun deck, 132 feet, 1 inch and 124.4, respectively; keel 110.10 3/4 and 102.8 1/2; beam, 34.5 1/2 and 33.10 3/8; hold 11, and 10.8. The committee voted to have a few eighteen pounders cast for these two frigates, and accordingly some guns of that weight were mounted on them (Magazine of History, December, 1908, and February, 1909. For the whole journal see lbid., November, 1908, to April, 1909. See Archives de la Marine, B7 459 (Whipple's letter of May 31, 1778)

Meanwhile, November 2, 1775, the Naval Committee had been given power by Congress to "agree with such officers and seamen as are proper to man and command " the vessels they had purchased and were fitting out. On the 5th the committee selected Esek Hopkins, an old sea captain of Providence and brother of Stephen Hopkins, for the command of this little fleet (Field's Life of Hopkins, 78.) December 7 John Paul Jones "was appointed Senior Lieut. of the Navy." (Jones MSS., October 10, 1776; Sands's Life of Jones, 33.) On the 22d the Naval Committee "laid before Congress a list of the officers by them appointed, agreeable to the resolutions of Congress, viz: Ezek Hopkins, Esqr., commander-in-chief of the fleet. Captains, Dudley Saltonstall, Esqr., of the Alfred, Abraham Whipple, Esqr., of the Columbus, Nicholas Biddle, Esqr., of the Andrew Doria, John Burrows Hopkins, Esqr., of the Cabot. 1st lieutenants, John Paul Jones [etc.] . . . Resolved, That the pay of the commander-in-chief of the Fleet be 125 dollars per calendar month. Resolved, That commissions be granted to the above officers agreeable to their rank in the above appointment." In addition to those named above there were in the list four other first lieutenants, five second lieutenants, and three third lieutenants (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 2, December 22, 1775.) This is the beginning of a list of officers for the Continental navy which, in the course of the war and including marine officers and those commissioned in France, contained nearly three hundred and thirty names (See Appendix VI.) There were in addition medical officers, pursers, midshipmen, and warrant officers of whom no lists have been preserved. The largest number of petty officers, seamen, and marines in the navy at any one time may have been about three thousand.

Uniforms for the officers of the navy were adopted by the Marine Committee September 5, 1776, but probably they were not commonly worn, as few officers could afford a complete outfit. For line officers a blue coat with red lapels, blue breeches, and red waistcoat were prescribed; for marine officers, a green coat faced with white and with a silver epaulette on the right shoulder, white waistcoat and breeches and black gaiters (Am. Arch., V, ii, 181.)

It has generally been supposed that the intention of Congress in making Hopkins commander-in-chief was to give him the same rank that Washington held in the army. It seems more likely, however, that Congress merely meant to give him command of this particular fleet. The wording of his appointment by the Naval Committee and of the resolutions quoted above, together with the fact that each of the captains was assigned, also by resolution of Congress, to a specified vessel, would indicate this. Stephen Hopkins, writing to Esek November 6, 1775, says: "You will perceive by a letter from the Committee, dated yesterday, that they have pitched upon you to take the Command of a Small Fleet, which they and I hope will be but the beginning of one much larger." (Hopkins, 78.) A resolution of Congress dated January 2, 1778, states that Hopkins "was appointed commander in chief of the fleet fitted out by the Naval Committee." (Jour. Cont. Congr., January 2, 1778.) He does not appear to have been mentioned officially and authoritatively, that is to say by the Naval or Marine Committee, though he was once by a special committee (Sands, 310.), as the commander-in-chief of the navy. In addition to his own fleet, several other Continental vessels cruised in 1776, which do not seem to have been under his orders (see ch. V) Hopkins was an elderly man at this time, having been born in 1718. He had spent much of his life at sea and was a privateersman in the French and Indian War (Hopkins, ch. i.)

Of the members of the committee of thirteen chosen December 14, 1775, "for carrying into execution the resolutions of Congress for fitting out armed vessels," ten had served on the committee of twelve which had recommended building the frigates and five had been members of the original Naval Committee. This new committee, consisting of one representative from each colony, became the second executive body for the administration of naval affairs. It was called the Marine Committee and was at first constituted as follows: Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire, John Hancock of Massachusetts, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, Silas Deane of Connecticut, Francis Lewis of New York, Stephen Crane of New Jersey, Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, George Read of Delaware, Samuel Chase of Maryland, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina, and John Houston of Georgia. The membership changed from time to time. The Naval Committee continued in the meantime to occupy itself in fitting out the small fleet of vessels purchased for the service and placed under the command of Commodore Hopkins, and to prepare for an expedition which was being planned. January 25,1776, although the Marine Committee had already taken charge of general naval affairs, Congress voted to leave the direction of this fleet to the Naval Committee, which soon afterwards, this duty being accomplished, ceased to exist (Jour. Cont. Congr., January 25,1776.) The Marine Committee employed agents to supervise the construction of the frigates in the distant colonies, taking charge itself of those at Philadelphia. Before the end of the year 1775 the organization of a Continental navy was achieved.

In the course of time the mass of details connected with naval administration became too much for the Marine Committee easily to handle. Prize agents in the various seacoast towns were appointed to superintend the trial and condemnation of the prizes taken by Continental cruisers. Most of the prize agents were also Continental agents, in which capacity they performed various other duties of a naval sort. John Bradford at Boston had the most important of these agencies (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1113, 1114.) For the further relief of the Marine Committee and at their suggestion, Congress appointed three persons, November 6, 1776, "to execute the business of the navy, under the direction" of the committee. This body of three was known as the Navy Board and the men appointed to serve on it were John Nixon and John Wharton of Pennsylvania and Francis Hopkinson of New Jersey. The lack of maritime knowledge and experience among members of Congress was keenly felt at this time. William Ellery of Rhode Island, who had recently become a member of the Marine Committee, wrote home to his friend William Vernon, November 7, 1776, "The Conduct of the Affairs of a Navy as well as those of an Army We are yet to learn. We are still unacquainted with the systematical Management of them." (Publications of R.I. Hist. Soc., viii (January, 1901), 201.) April 19, 1777, another committee of three was authorized, to take charge of naval affairs in New England; the men selected for this board were William Vernon of Rhode Island, James Warren of Massachusetts, and John Deshon of Connecticut. The first of these boards was then called the Navy Board of the Middle Department or District, the second the Navy Board of the Eastern Department, or they were called the boards at Philadelphia and at Boston respectively (Jour. Cont. Congr., April 23, November 6,1776, April 19,1777.)

The Eastern Navy Board, owing to its distance from the seat of government at Philadelphia, was allowed more discretion and became a more important body than that of the middle department. The greater naval activity in New England waters, due to remoteness from the centre of military operations, put more work and responsibility on the eastern board. Its original members retained office several years without change. Their instructions, dated July 10, 1777, imposed upon them "the Superintendance of all Naval and Marine Affairs of the United States of America within the four Eastern States under the direction of the Marine Committee" in "whatever relates to the Building, Manning, and fitting for Sea all Armed Vessels of the United States built, or ordered by the Congress to build in the Eastern Department, and to provide all materials and Stores necessary for that purpose." They were "to keep an exact Register of all the Officers, Sailors, and Marines in the Continental Navy fitted and Manned within" the eastern district, and were "empower'd to order Courts Martial." They were also instructed to keep strict account of expenditures and to do many other things (Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 207-210.)

With further experience it became apparent that the Marine Committee was too large and its members too deficient in special knowledge of naval science to admit of prompt, capable, and expert handling of the affairs entrusted to them. In October, 1776, John Paul Jones wrote to Robert Morris (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1106; Sands, 55) that efficiency in naval administration could only be obtained by the appointment of a competent board of admiralty. William Ellery wrote to William Vernon, February 26, 1777: "The Congress are fully sensible of the Importance of having a respectable Navy and have endeavoured to form and equip One, but through Ignorance and Neglect they have not been able to accomplish their Purpose yet. I hope however to see One afloat before long. A proper Board of Admiralty is very much wanted. The Members of Congress are unacquainted with this Department. As One of the Marine Committee I sensibly feel my Ignorance in this Respect." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 204.) For three years, however, little was done in the way of improving administration except the appointment of the navy boards and agents. Finally, October 28, 1779, upon the recommendation of the Marine Committee a Board of Admiralty was established by Congress. This was a body of five members, two of whom were to be members of Congress, while the other three, called commissioners, were to be men possessing a knowledge of naval matters. A quorum of three was necessary for the transaction of business. The Marine Committee then came to an end, but the navy boards at Philadelphia and Boston and the navy agents were retained under this reorganization (Jour. Cont. Congr., June 9, October 28, 1779.)

Positions on the Board of Admiralty were declined by several to whom they were offered, and it was not only difficult to keep two congressional members continuously on the board, but it proved to be impossible to find three suitable persons willing to serve as commissioners. Consequently the membership was never full and the work of the board was much interrupted by frequent lack of a quorum. As first organized, in December, 1779, the Board of Admiralty contained three members: Francis Lewis of New York, commissioner; James Forbes of Maryland and William Ellery of Rhode Island, congressional members. A few months later Forbes died and his place was taken by James Madison of Virginia. The Board of Admiralty was much hampered by half-hearted cooperation on the part of Congress and by want of money. Its membership dwindled to a point where nothing could be done in default of a quorum, until finally, in the summer of 1781, it passed out of existence (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 26, December 3, 7, 8, 1779.)

Meanwhile, February 7, 1781, Congress had passed a resolution putting the affairs of the navy under a single head, to be called the Secretary of Marine. No one was found, however, to take the place and the office was never filled. Robert Morris, who as Superintendent of Finance had close relations with the navy, gradually assumed direction of naval affairs as the Board of Admiralty became more and more helpless. August 29 Congress voted to appoint an Agent of Marine to take charge of naval matters until a secretary could be found, and September 7 it placed these affairs under the care of the Superintendent of Finance until an agent could be appointed. The navy boards were abolished, although the board at Boston continued its functions several months longer. The result of it all was that Morris continued to direct naval affairs, as Agent of Marine, during the remainder of the war. He had already served on the Marine Committee and his great ability, business experience, and familiarity with maritime affairs made him the best executive head that the navy could have had (Jour. Cont. Congr., February 7, August 29, September 7, 1781.)

By way of summary it is perhaps well to review in a few words the history of the administration of the Continental navy. The first executive of the service was the Naval Committee which in 1775 began the work of organizing a navy. Next came the Marine Committee which directed naval affairs for four years, ending in December 1779. Then followed the Board of Admiralty which managed the department a year and a half, when, in the summer of 1781, Robert Morris took charge and as Agent of Marine remained at the head of the navy until after the end of the war.

As soon as representatives of the United States had established themselves in France, naval affairs became an important part of their duties. This began in July, 1776, with Silas Deane, the first American agent. After the arrival of Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee in the following December, to serve with Deane as commissioners, they shared the duties with him, although he still continued to exercise special supervision of naval matters until the spring of 1778, when he was superseded as commissioner by John Adams. After this, Franklin did the largest share of naval work, and from the time of his assuming the office of minister to France in February, 1779, he had sole charge of naval affairs abroad until the end of the war. This naval office in Paris had agents in various ports of France and in a few of Spain and Holland. It performed many functions, such as buying, building, manning, and fitting out vessels and providing naval stores, commissioning officers, directing cruises, disposing of prizes, exchanging prisoners, and commissioning privateers. Besides this office in France the naval interests of the United States in the West Indies and in Louisiana were entrusted to agents. These were William Bingham at Martinique, and Oliver Pollock in New Orleans (Paullin, ch. ix; Wharton's Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, letters of Deans and Franklin; Hale's Franklin in France.)

The sentiment of local independence and the loose federation of the colonies, united only for mutual protection, naturally led to individual action, and the need that each state felt of the defense of its own shores, too urgent to wait for the deliberations of the Continental Congress, brought about the establishment of separate small navies; so that, in addition to the Continental navy, eleven of the thirteen states maintained armed vessels, New Jersey and Delaware being the exceptions. Naval administration in the various states was generally, at the outset, in charge of the Committee of Safety, and later, of the state executive or of a board which had under its care naval affairs alone or in combination with military affairs. The state navies varied much in size and force. Being used chiefly for coast defense, the vessels were usually smaller than those of the Continental navy, and many of them were merely boats and galleys adapted for operating in shallow waters. Some of the state ships, however, were ocean cruisers of considerable size and force (For the state navies, see Paullin, chs. xi-xvii.)

The first American armed vessels commissioned by any public authority were two sloops fitted out by Rhode Island, June 15, 1775. The people of this colony had been annoyed by the British frigate Rose, cruising in Narragansett Bay. These sloops immediately went to sea under the command of Abraham Whipple, and on the same day, June 15, chased ashore and destroyed a tender of the Rose (Boston Gazette, July 3, 1775; Historical Magazine, April, 1868; Am. Arch., IV, ii, 1118; Hopkins, 63-67; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 485, June 19, 1775.) One of the sloops, the Katy, was subsequently taken into the Continental service under the name Providence. The state of Rhode Island afterwards kept a small force cruising in the bay.

In the course of the war the Massachusetts navy comprised fifteen seagoing vessels and one galley.

The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, after some ineffectual attempts in June, 1775, to provide for armed vessels, made a beginning August 21, by taking the Machias Liberty and Diligent into the service of the colony (Jour. Third Provincial Congress of Mass., June 7, 11, 13, 20, 1775.) The actual establishment of a state navy, however, came in the following winter, when a committee was appointed December 29, of which John Adams was a member, "to consider & report a plan for fitting out Armed Vessels for the defence of American Liberty." (Records of General Court of Mass., December 29, 1775, January 11, February 7, 8, 17, April 20, 1776; Paullin, ch. xi.) In decisive action looking towards a naval force Connecticut preceded Massachusetts. Early in July, 1775, two vessels were provided for and in August they were purchased. A valuable prize was taken in October. Connecticut fitted out twelve vessels during the war, four of them galleys (Papers New London Hist. Soc., Part IV, i (1893), 34; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 264-268; Paullin, ch. xii.)

Pennsylvania began July 6, 1775, by providing for the defense of the Delaware River by means of boats and galleys. The Pennsylvania navy consisted of about ten vessels and nearly thirty boats and galleys for river and bay defense. The fleet was under the command of a commodore (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 495, 510, 511, 858, 862, 1811, 1820, 1836, 1839, iv, 515, 521; Penn. Archives, Series II, i; Wallace's Life of William Bradford; Paullin, ch. xiii.) The Virginia navy, authorized by the Provincial Convention in December, 1775, comprised first and last seventy two vessels of all classes including many ships, brigs and schooners; but apparently most of them were small, poorly manned, and lightly armed, and were used largely for commerce. The naval duties of the fleet were confined mostly to Chesapeake Bay (Southern Literary Messenger, January to April, 1857; Virginia Hist. Register, July, April, October, 1848; Va. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., July, 1893; Am. Arch., IV, iv, 114, 866, v, 227, vi, 1598; Paullin, ch. xiv.) Maryland shared with Virginia the defense of Chesapeake Bay, and in addition to one vessel of some size and force, maintained a considerable fleet of galleys, boats, and barges (Am. Arch., IV, v, 1509,1510.) The chief concern of North Carolina was to protect and keep open Ocracoke Inlet, connecting Pamlico Sound with the ocean, through which an important part of the commerce, not only of North Carolina but of Virginia, was carried on. A small fleet for this purpose was stationed in the sounds (Ibid., 1357, 1363.) Georgia's navy was small and unimportant, consisting mostly of galleys. A schooner, however, was commissioned as early as June, 1775 9Paullin, ch. xvi, for Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina.) The defense of Charleston required a considerable force, and South Carolina was one of the first states to begin the organization of a navy. She appears to have had about fifteen sea-going vessels, some of them larger and more heavily armed than any other state or Continental ships. The force also included several galleys (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 180, iv, 45-54; Paullin, ch. xv.) As regards the two remaining states, New York's naval enterprise was confined to organizing a small fleet for local defense. The early occupation by the British of New York City and the adjacent waters prevented any further operations (Jour. Prov. Congr. of New York, i, 228, 349; Am. Arch., IV, v, 1401, 1450.) New Hampshire voted in 1776 to build a galley and appointed a committee to procure an armed vessel. After this her only naval activity, aside from encouraging privateering and setting up a prize court, consisted in fitting out a twenty-two-gun ship for temporary service in 1779 (Ibid., 10, 15, 17, 24; Paullin, ch. xvii.)

Privateers composed the third and a very important class of vessels employed during the Revolution. The word privateer was used at that time, and later, too, with the utmost disregard of its true meaning. Persons with an understanding of maritime affairs constantly spoke of Continental and state cruisers, especially the smaller ones, as privateers. The term was often wrongly used even in official correspondence. It is necessary that lines should be sharply drawn between these different classes of armed vessels. Letters of marque, so called from the letters or commissions they carried, were armed trading vessels authorized to make prizes. They also were generally, and more properly, called privateers. The latter name should, strictly speaking, be reserved for private armed vessels carrying no cargo and devoted exclusively to warlike use. All kinds of armed vessels, however, during the Revolution, even Continental frigates, were employed under special circumstances as cargo carriers.

The General Court of Massachusetts, November 1, 1775, passed "An Act for Encouraging the Fixing out of Armed Vessells, to defend the Sea Coast of America, and for Erecting a Court to Try and Condemn all Vessells that shall be found infesting the same." The preamble of this important measure, written by Elbridge Gerry, set forth in detail the justification of the colonists in taking up arms. "Whereas the present administration of Great Britain, being divested of justice and humanity and strangers to that magnanimity and sacred regard for liberty which inspired their venerable predecessors, have been endeavouring thro' a series of years to establish a system of despotism over the American colonies and by their venal and corrupt measures have so extended their influence over the British parliament that, by a prostituted majority, it is now become a political engine of slavery; and whereas the military tools of these our unnatural enemies, while restrained by the united forces of the American colonies from proceeding in their sanguinary career of devastation and slaughter, are infesting the sea coast with armed vessells and daily endeavouring to distress the inhabitants by burning their towns and destroying their dwellings . . . and making captures of provision and other vessels, being the property of said inhabitants; and whereas their majesties King William and Queen Mary by the royal charter of this colony . . . did grant, establish and ordain that, in the absence of the governor and lieutenant-governor of the colony, a majority of the council shall have full power . . . for the special defence of their said province or territory, to assemble in martial array and put in warlike posture the inhabitants of their said province or territory and to lead and conduct them and with them to encounter, expulse, resist and pursue by force of arms, as well by sea as by land, . . . and also to kill, slay, destroy, and conquer by all fitting ways, enterprizes and means whatsoever all and every such person and persons as should at any time thereafter attempt or enterprize the destruction, invasion, detriment or annoyance of their said province or territory . . . ; and whereas it is expressly resolved by the grand Congress of America, 'That each colony, at their own expence, make such provision by armed vessells or otherwise . . . as their respective assemblies . . . shall judge expedient . . . for the protection of their harbours and navigation on the sea-coasts,' . . . and it is the duty and interest of this colony to exert itself, as well for the purpose of keeping supplies from the enemy as for those mentioned in the paragraphs of the charter and resolve now recited; therefore . . . Be it enacted," etc. This act authorized a majority of the council to commission masters of private armed vessels. During the following winter and spring other acts were passed supplementing or superseding that of November 1. Courts for the trial of prizes were established at Plymouth, Ipswich, and Falmouth (Portland); and April 13, 1776, it was provided that in addition to these places courts might also be held in Barnstable or Dartmouth for the southern district, in Boston, Salem, or Newburyport for the middle district, and in Pownalborough (Wiscasset) for the eastern district (Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, November 1, 1775, February 14, March 19, April 13, May 8, 1776.) Massachusetts probably sent out not far from one half of all the American private armed vessels commissioned during the Revolution.

The Continental Congress authorized privateering March 23,1776, and on April 2 and 3 adopted a form of Commission for privateers and resolved to send copies in blank, signed by the President of Congress, to the various colonies, there to be issued to privateersmen giving bonds; a set of instructions for commanding officers was drafted (See Appendix III.) Several of the colonies or states used these Continental commissions altogether, not establishing state privateering. Pennsylvania sent out flve hundred vessels under Continental commissions and, it is believed, used no others. Six hundred and twenty-six Massachusetts privateers sailed under Continental letters of marque, but that state also sent nearly a thousand others to sea under her own commissions; it is probable, however, that in many instances the same vessel may have sailed at one time under one commission and later under the other. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland, and South Carolina, and probably some of the other states, issued their own commissions, but the first four also employed those of the Congress - Connecticut and Maryland more than two hundred each. Sixty-four Virginia privateers sailed under Continental commissions. The American Commissioners in Paris - later the minister to France - and the naval agent of Congress in the West Indies likewise commissioned privateers. A rough estimate only of the total number and force of American vessels engaged in privateering on the patriotic side during the Revolution is possible. The Library of Congress has printed a list of nearly seventeen hundred letters of marque issued by the Continental Congress to privateers carrying, approximately, fifteen thousand guns - probably light ones for the most part - and fifty-nine thousand men. After deducting duplicates, that is to say, in cases of two or more commissions being successively issued to the same vessel, and deducting also armed boats and galleys, there remain more than thirteen hundred sea-going vessels. The thousand commissions issued by Massachusetts probably represented more than seven hundred different vessels, after making the same proportionate allowance for duplicates. Several hundred additional privateers must have been commissioned by other states and in France and the West Indies. Assuming the total number of private armed vessels to have been two thousand, and there were probably a good many more, they doubtless carried very nearly eighteen thousand guns and seventy thousand men. There seem to have been about the same number of British privateersmen, according to Governor Hutchinson, who, speaking of the difficulty of manning the British navy, says: "Some have proposed pressing the crews of all privateers, in which service it is computed 70,000 men are employed." (Diary, ii, 264 (June 27, 1779.) Judging from the scanty information at hand concerning British privateering, it is probable that their vessels engaged in this form of warfare were considerably less numerous but decidedly superior in force to the Americans; the latter seem to have carried on the average between eight and nine guns and less than thirty-five men, the British about seventeen guns and seventy-five or more men (Jour. Cont. Congr., March 23, April 2, 3, 1776, May 2,1780; Naval Records of Amer. Rev. (calendar), 217-495; Emmons's Statistical History of the Navy, 127; Mass. Archives, clxiv to clxxii; Penn. Archives, II, i, 366; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 27; Sheffield's Rhode Island Privateers; Paullin; Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson; Williams's History of Liverpool Privateers, App. iv, list of 95 vessels; London Chronicle, April 1, 29,1779, lists of 100 privateers from Liverpool and 121 from New York; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, February 27, 1779, No. 3, list of 69 New York privateers. See Appendix VII.)

Valuable service to the country was rendered by the privateers, and they contributed in a large degree to the naval defense, and so to the fortunate outcome of the war. On the other hand, the system was subject to abuses and was in many ways detrimental to the regular naval service. William Whipple, writing to Josiah Bartlett from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, July 12, 1778, says: "I agree with you that the privateers have much distressed the trade of our Enemies, but had there been no privateers is it not probable there would have been a much larger number of Public Ships than has been fitted out, which might have distressed the Enemy nearly as much & furnished these States with necessaries on much better terms than they have been supplied by Privateers ? . . . No kind of Business can so effectually introduce Luxury, Extravagance and every kind of Dissipation, that tend to the destruction of the morals of people. Those who are actually engaged in it soon lose every Idea of right & wrong, & for want of an opportunity of gratifying their insatiable avarice with the property of the Enemies of their Country, will without the least compunction seize that of her Friends . . . There is at this time 5 Privateers fitting out here, which I suppose will take 400 men. These must be by far the greater part Countrymen, for the Seamen are chiefly gone, & most of them in Hallifax Gaol. Besides all this, you may depend no public ship will ever be manned while there is a privateer fitting out. The reason is plain: Those people who have the most influence with Seamen think it their interest to discourage the Public service, because by that they promote their own interest, viz., Privateering." (Historical Magazine, March, 1862.)

As intimated in the foregoing, privateers at times made trouble by seizing neutral vessels. In his advocacy of a strong navy in preference to a service under private control Whipple was in advance of his time. William Vernon, of the Navy Board at Boston, wrote to John Adams, December 17, 1778, that the Continental ships in port "may sail in Three Weeks, if it was possible to get Men, wch we shall never be able to accomplish, unless some method is taken to prevent desertion, and a stopage of Private Ships Sailing, until our ships are Mann'd. The infamous practice of seducing our Men to leave the ships and taking them off at an out-Port, with many other base methods, will make it impossible ever to get our ships ready to Sail in force, or perhaps otherwise than single Ships." He wishes that "an Embargo upon all Private Property, whether Arm'd or Merchant ships, may take Place thro' all the United States, until the Fleet is compleatly Mann'd.... You can scarsely form an Idea of the increase and groath of the extravagance of the People in their demands for Labour and every Article for Sale &c; dissipation has no bounds at present; when or where it will stop, or if a reform will take place, I dare not predict." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 256.) The expedient of laying a temporary embargo upon privateers was occasionally resorted to.

A more favorable opinion of privateering is found in a letter of John Adams to the President of Congress, dated Amsterdam, September 16, 1780. Speaking of commerce destroying he says: "This is a short, easy, and infallible method of humbling the English, preventing the effusion of an ocean of blood, and bringing the war to a conclusion. In this policy I hope our countrymen will join [the French and Spanish] with the utmost alacrity. Privateering is as well understood by them as any people whatsoever; and it is by cutting off supplies, not by attacks, sieges, or assaults, that I expect deliverance from enemies." (Wharton, iv, 58. On the Profits Of privateering, see Channing, iii, 398.)

No doubt what was then needed, as in every war, was a well-balanced naval force made up of a sufficient number of fighting ships and commerce destroyers in the right proportions. Privateering was more popular than the regular naval service on account of the greater freedom from the restraints of military discipline and because the profits were larger; for privateersmen were devoted almost wholly to commerce destroying and were consequently likely to take more prizes in the long run. In addition to this and besides having higher pay, the entire value of their prizes went to the owners and captors. When the prizes of Continental cruisers were ships of war, one half the proceeds went to the captors, and in other cases only one third. In October, 1776, Congress increased the shares of the captors to the whole and to one half the value of these two classes of prizes respectively, in order to put Continental vessels more nearly on terms of equality with privateers. Bounties and other inducements were resorted to for the purpose of obtaining recruits. It would probably have been better if not more than half as many private commissions had been issued, provided that a correspondingly more powerful regular fleet could have been put upon the sea (Jour. Cont. Congr., April 17, August 5, October 30, 1776, March 29, 1777, July 11, 1780. For further discussion of privateering and commerce destroying, see ch. XIX.)

It occasionally happened during the Revolution that vessels built or purchased and fitted out for the Continental service subsequently found their way into one of the state navies, or perhaps became privateers ; and the reverse was also true in one or two instances. It was also the case not infrequently that two or all three of the different classes of vessels cruised together in squadrons or on expeditions. Officers likewise, beginning as privateersmen or in state service, were sometimes transferred to the Continental navy; and, on the other hand, unemployed Continental officers and seamen, especially towards the end of the war, sought service in the state navies or in privateers. For these reasons there was to some extent a sort of blending of the three classes of sea service, both as regards ships and personnel. The narrative therefore will follow a more natural course in describing the naval operations of the war to a certain extent in a chronological or geographical order and not strictly in conformity with the classes of service concerned.

The disparity between the sea power of America and that of England, great as it actually was, will be found less marked than mere figures would indicate, when we inquire into the true condition of the British fleet and of naval administration in England. Our enemy had many difficulties to contend with which must be set off against the numbers of ships, guns, and men to be found in statistical tables. After the Revolution of 1688 the navy was less dependent on the King than it formerly had been and looked more to Parliament for favor, which was an advantage in some ways, but brought the service more into partisan politics. During the first three quarters and more of the eighteenth century the British navy suffered much from corruption and mismanagement in civil administration, and at times also from incompetent commanders at sea. Before the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 a high degree of efficiency had been brought about, but after that a decided falling off took place and continued many years (Hannay's Short History of the Royal Navy, ii, 2, 101, 117, 118,133,134,136.)

It is not easy to make an estimate of the real strength of the British navy at the time of the American Revolution, for figures derived from different sources vary, and many ships were sent to sea in such poor condition that they were by no means able to perform the service to be expected from their nominal force. The number of vessels of all classes in 1775 was stated to be two hundred and seventy, including one hundred and thirty-one ships of the line, that is, ships carrying sixty or more guns on two or more decks; in 1783 the number was four hundred and sixty- eight, including a hundred and seventy-four ships of the line. During the same time the number of men increased from eighteen thousand to one hundred and ten thousand. In January, 1778, there were supposed to be two hundred and seventy-four vessels of all classes ready for immediate service, of which ninety-two were on the North American station besides thirteen at Newfoundland and forty-one in the West Indies. At the end of the year the total effective force was three hundred and seventeen, while the numbers in the Western Hemisphere were somewhat reduced. These figures seem formidable when compared with those of the Continental navy, including Washington's little fleet in Massachusetts Bay, which comprised altogether, during the whole course of the war, between fifty and sixty vessels in actual service, rating from thirty-two-gun frigates down to small schooners and sloops. To these are to be added the small craft on inland waters, the state navies, including perhaps forty or more sea-going cruisers, and the privateers, numerous to be sure, and capable of inflicting serious injury upon commerce, but in no sense a menace even to the lighter regular cruisers of the enemy. These American figures of course very greatly exceed the number in service at any one time. Nevertheless the British were beset with manifold troubles and their ships found plenty of occupation. The active and fast-sailing rebel privateers required close watching and led their pursuers many a long chase. Supplies had to be brought from Europe, and for the convoy of these as well as of troop-ships a considerable part of their force must be diverted from purely warlike employment. The loss of the seafaring population of America as a source of supply for the manning of the British navy was likewise severely felt at a time when naval expansion was necessary. In 1778 the navy of France and later those of Spain and Holland entered the contest against England and threatened her naval supremacy (Hannay, ii, 210-214, 219; Clowes's Royal Navy, iii, 327, 328; Schomberg's Naval Chronology, i, 424, 436, 440, 453, ii, 1, 36, 68, 124; Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs, iv, 291; Data collected by R. W. Neeser from Parliamentary Reports and other sources. See also Weeser's Introduction to Naval History Society Publications, iii.)

Yet a foe to the British navy more malign than foreign navies was found in the Admiralty at home, and that was maladministration. In 1771 the Earl of Sandwich, who had previously been first lord of the Admiralty for two short terms, was again appointed to the office and held it until 1782. The administration of the navy under Sandwich was not only weak, but reached nearly the lowest depths of corruption. In 1778, "embezzlement, larceny, swindling" and other like abuses prevailed in the dockyards. Money was voted for repairs and the ships were not repaired. "Vessels reported as well found and ready for sea lay in the naval harbours rotting." From 1775 to 1782, seventy-six vessels of the navy, including fourteen of sixty-four or more guns, "capsized, foundered, or were wrecked." The nation was charged with four thousand more men than were rated on the books of the navy. There was collusion between dockyard officials and shipowners; the former would inspect and condemn vessels and the latter, having bought a ship, would change her name and appearance and sell her back to the government for transport service (Belcher's First American Civil War, i, 290-292.) Some of the admirals participated in the fruits of embezzlement, and the management of naval affairs at New York under Arbuthnot was corrupt. Maltreatment of seamen, bad food, scurvy, and other evils were due largely to the dishonesty of pursers. Insubordination and disaffection resulted, and it was said that from 1774 to 1780 forty-two thousand men deserted from the navy. During the same time eighteen thousand died of disease. Incompetent medical service was the rule, and the mortality, especially in tropical seas, was appalling; but an exception to this is to be found in the fleet of Admiral Rodney, whose surgeon brought about reforms which saved countless lives (Belcher, 295-297, 304-308; Publications of Navy Records Soc., xxxii, 80-83; Hannay, ii, 205-210, 214-216; Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc., xliv, 364-368 ; Data collected by R. W. Neeser.)

Charles Middleton, the comptroller of the navy, in the course of correspondence with Sandwich, spoke very plainly of the abuses in naval administration (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 2-10, 16-30.) In 1779 he writes, "The desertions from ships and hospitals are beyond imagination. The discipline of service is entirely lost, and to a great measure owing to admiralty indulgences, but still more to admiralty negligence. The want of vigour at that board has weakened its authority to such a degree over the officers of the fleet, that no respect is paid to its orders . . . For want of Plan, for want of men of professional knowledge used to business to assist at the admiralty, and for want of method and execution, one error has produced another, and the whole has become such a mass of confusion, that I see no prospect of reducing it to order. All I can do at the navy office will avail but little if the admiralty continues what it is at present. It is, indeed, so wretchedly bad, that if I waited for official orders and kept within the mere line of duty without pressing or proposing what ought to come unasked for, we must inevitably stand still . . . The whole system of the admiralty is rotten . . . The dockyards, from want of proper attention to appointments, are in wretched disabled state, without spirit, without discipline." (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 4, 5, 6.) In another letter he says: "For want of proper men to conduct the business at the ports, no expedition is used in refitting the ships. The officers are not kept to their duty. The men are daily deserting in scores, and those who remain are inclined to mutiny." (Ibid., 7.) Again, February 3, 1781, after relating much of the same sort, he observes: "I cannot be an acquiescent witness of the present weak state of the yards, and likely to continue so, according to the current arrangements, at a crisis when the utmost efforts of every officer in every department of the navy from the highest to the lowest, are most loudly demanded." (Ibid., 26.) To this Sandwich replies: "I have neither leisure nor inclination to enter into a discussion upon the subject of the letter with which you have favoured me." (Ibid., 27.) In 1786, Middleton, speaking of Sandwich's administration, says that "all his successors, notwithstanding their great pretensions to a regard for the public service, have proceeded in the same way; and I find politics have got too great a hold on this branch of the navy for me to withstand it." (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 30.)

It may be inferred from all this that the British navy was less formidable than the imposing array of ships on the printed lists would indicate; and yet service traditions of the right sort and fitness for the sea gave the English a superiority as a fighting force over other European navies out of proportion to their numbers.

Chapter III
Washington's Fleet, 1775 And 1776
General Washington took command of the American army at Cambridge July 3, 1775, and the siege of Boston was closely maintained at every point except on the water side of the town. Here the British received provisions and military stores without interruption. It was of great importance to intercept these supplies as far as possible with a view to distressing the enemy; and furthermore the scarcity of the munitions of war with the colonists suggested their capture from the British as the readiest means of obtaining them. In August, Washington had some correspondence with the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts as to the advisability of fitting out armed vessels for the purpose, but without immediate result (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 327.)

Accordingly, there being no Continental naval establishment at that time, he determined to employ detachments of the army, for which he required no further authority than the general discretion allowed him for the effective prosecution of the siege. The regiments recruited in Salem, Marblehead, Beverly, and other shore towns were composed largely of seafaring men; the regiment of Colonel John Glover of Marblehead afterwards became noted for ferrying the Continental army across the East River to New York after the Battle of Long Island and across the Delaware before the Battle of Trenton. Washington drew upon these regiments of sailors and fishermen for the crews of the vessels fitted out in the fall of 1775.

The first of these vessels was the schooner Hannah, and Captain Nicholson Broughton was put in command. His instructions, signed by Washington and dated September 2, 1775, were as follows: "You, being appointed a Captain in the Army of the United Colonies of North-America, are hereby directed to take the command of a detachment of said Army and proceed on board the Schooner Hannah, at Beverly, lately fitted out and equipped with arms, ammunition and provisions, at the Continental expense. You are to proceed, as commander of said Schooner, immediately on a cruise against such vessels as may be found on the high seas or elsewhere, bound inwards and outwards, to or from Boston, in the service of the Ministerial Army, and to take and seize all such vessels laden with soldiers, arms, ammunition or provisions, for or from said Army, or which you shall have good reason to suspect are in such service." Broughton was to send his prizes into "the safest and nearest Port to this camp"; papers disclosing the enemy's designs were to be searched for; prisoners were to be humanely treated, allowed to retain their private property and sent to headquarters under a guard furnished by the Continental officer stationed at the port; the apportionment of prize money was prescribed; armed vessels of the enemy were to be avoided, the sole object of the enterprise being the interception of supplies; a system of signals was to be established for communicating with other vessels to be sent out. The instructions concluded with the injunction "to be extremely careful and frugal of your ammunition; by no means to waste any of it in salutes, or any purpose but what is absolutely necessary'' (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 633.)

Broughton went to sea September 5; two days later he put into Gloucester and made the following report: "I sailed from Beverly last Tuesday at ten o'clock, with a fair wind; proceeded on my cruise. On the same day, about five o'clock, saw two ships of war; they gave me chase. I made back towards Cape Ann, but did not go in. Next morning I saw a ship under my lee quarter; she giving me chase, I run into Cape Ann harbour. I went out again that night about sunset and stood to the southward. Next morning saw a ship under my lee quarter; I perceived her to be a large ship. I tacked and stood back for the land; soon after I put about and stood towards her again and found her a ship of no force. I came up with her, hailed, and asked where she came from; was answered, from Piscataqua, and bound to Boston. I told him he must bear away and go into Cape Ann; but being very loth, I told him if he did not I should fire on her. On that she bore away and I have brought her safe into Cape Ann harbour, and have delivered the ship and prisoners into the hands and care of the Committee of Safety for this Town of Gloucester, and have desired them to send the prisoners under proper guard to your Excellency for further orders." This prize was the ship Unity, loaded with naval stores and lumber (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 668,683.) It was the first capture made by a Continental vessel.

Early in October Colonel Glover was instructed to procure two other vessels in Salem or Newburyport and fit them out as soon as possible. The Hannah was laid aside, and in her place another schooner was hired, "of better fame for sailing." There was considerable delay in getting these vessels ready for sea (Ibid., 946, 948, 994.) Meanwhile Washington had received the instructions of Congress of October 5, to attempt the capture of the two brigs bound to Quebec (See above, p. 22.) Governor Cooke of Rhode Island was unable to give aid in this matter, one of the Rhode Island vessels being unfit for service, while the other, the sloop Katy, Captain Whipple, was on a voyage to Bermuda in quest of powder. For several weeks General Washington and Governor Cooke had been corresponding in regard to this enterprise. The scarcity of gunpowder in the American army caused Washington great anxiety, and at his solicitation the governor had dispatched the Katy to Bermuda, which at that time seemed to be the most likely place to get it (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 36, 69, 137, 461, 631, 653, 654, 682, 710, 718, 728, 808, 842, 1037.) The people of Bermuda were friendly to the popular cause in America and gave trouble to the British by their opposition to the enforcement of laws forbidding trade with the Revolutionists (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, No. 55, March 16, 1778.)

For the expedition to the Gulf of St. Lawrence two of the schooners recently procured were chosen. They were called the Lynch and the Franklin and were put under the command of Captains Broughton and Selman. Their orders were issued October 16: "The honourable Continental Congress having received intelligence that two north country brigantines of no force sailed from England some time ago for Quebeck, laden with six thousand stands of arms, a large quantity of powder and other stores, you are hereby directed to make all possible despatch for the River St. Lawrence and there to take such a station as will best enable you to intercept the above vessels. You are also to seize and take any other transports laden with men, ammunition, clothing, or other stores for the use of the Ministerial Army or Navy in America, and secure them in such places as may be most safe and convenient." Captain Broughton was to command the expedition. If they found that the brigs had already passed, they were still to cruise off the mouth of the river as long as the season would permit and attempt to seize all vessels in the service of the British army. It was thought that in case of the capture of Quebec by the Americans, such vessels would be likely to come down the river. Canadian vessels, however, not in the British service, were not to be in any way molested. After some further delay the Lynch and Franklin sailed from Marblehead October 21 (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1068, 1075, 1076, 1083, 1109, 1134.)

Soon after this, Captain Whipple returned from Bermuda, where he had been well received by the people, but found no powder. The Katy was at once fitted out for a cruise to the eastward. In the meantime work had been pushed on other vessels for Washington's fleet under many difficulties, and by the end of October four, in addition to the Lynch and Franklin, were ready for service. They were the schooners Lee and Warren at Salem and Marblehead and the brigantine Washington and schooner Harrison at Plymouth. The Lee, commanded by Captain Manley of Marblehead, and Harrison, Captain Coit of Connecticut, were at sea October 29; the Warren, Captain Adams of New Hampshire, and the Washington, Captain Martindale of Rhode Island, got away early in November. Their services were needed, as the enemy's transports continued to arrive in Boston. Colonel Joseph Reed, Washington's military secretary, suggested as colors for the fleet "a flag with a white ground, a tree in the middle, the motto, 'Appeal to Heaven.'" This, the New England pine-tree flag, was used on the floating batteries about Boston, and six months later was prescribed by the Provincial Congress for the Massachusetts navy (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1083, 1126, 1134, 1167, 1181, 1182, 1208, 1246,1250,1251,1345; Rec. Gen. Court Mass., April 29, 1776.)

The Lynch and Franklin arrived in the Strait of Canso early in November and cruised in this neighborhood about two weeks, not being able to get further at that time on account of head winds. They took a few small vessels which were afterwards released, not being considered lawful prize. November 17 they appeared before Charlottetown, the capital of the Island of St. John's (Prince Edward Island). This was the farthest point they reached. Here the conduct of Broughton and Selman showed a singular want of propriety for which their only excuse seems to have been the information they had received that preparations were being carried on there for assisting in the defense of Quebec. They supposed they "should do essential service by breaking up a nest of recruits intended to be sent against Montgomery, who commanded our forces in Quebeck." In the excess of their zeal the Americans seized both public and private property and brought away as prisoners three prominent citizens, including the acting governor. Upon arriving at Cambridge, these men were promptly released and their property restored by General Washington, who severely reproved Broughton and Selman. Washington was disappointed and dissatisfied with the results of this enterprise, and believed that if they had gone farther and cruised in the mouth of the St. Lawrence, "all the vessels coming down that river must [have fallen] into their hands." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1337, 1379, 1407, 1419, iv, 158, 178, 181, 214, 451; Salem Gazette, July 22, 1856, quoted in Waite's Origin of the American Navy.)

Meanwhile the other vessels of Washington's little fleet cruised with more or less success. The Harrison brought two prizes into Plymouth November 6; they were a schooner and sloop from Nova Scotia bound to Boston with provisions. As the season advanced and the weather became severe, some of these soldier sailors grew discontented and troublesome. William Watson, Washington's agent at Plymouth, on November 23 found the crew of the Harrison "an uneasy set of fellows who have got soured by the severity of the season," and on the 29th he wrote to the commander-in-chief "that the people on board the Brigantine Washington are in general discontented and have agreed to do no duty on board said vessel, and say that they enlisted to serve in the army and not as marines. I believe Capt. Martindale has done all in his power to make things easy. His people really appear to me to be a set of the most unprincipled abandoned fellows I ever saw. I am very apprehensive that little is to be expected from fellows drawn promiscuously from the army for this business; but that if people were enlisted for the purpose of privateering, much might be expected from them." Washington wrote to the President of Congress December 4: "The plague, trouble and vexation I have had with the crews of all the armed vessels is inexpressible. I do believe there is not on earth a more disorderly set. Every time they come into port we hear of nothing but mutinous complaints. Manly's success has lately, and but lately, quieted his people. The crews of the Washington and Harrison have actually deserted them, so that I have been under the necessity of ordering the agent to lay the latter up, and get hands for the other on the best terms he could." On the same day, however, news of a fortunate cruise of Captain Manley having reached Plymouth, Watson wrote: "After repairing on board the brig Saturday night, inquiring into the cause of the uneasiness among the people and finding it principally owing to their want of clothing, and after supplying them with what they wanted, the whole crew, to a man, gave three cheers and declared their readiness to go to sea the next morning. The warm weather at that time and the news of Captain Manly's good success had a very happy influence on the minds of the people." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1378, 1658, 1713, iv, 179, 181.)

John Manley was the most successful of the captains and was regarded by Washington with especial favor. He was about forty-two years of age and of English birth, but had lived since early manhood in Marblehead. His vessel, the Lee, was a seventy-two ton schooner carrying a large square-sail on the fore topmast; she mounted four four-pounders and ten swivels, and was manned by fifty soldiers from Glover's regiment. Early in November Manley captured two or three small vessels. About the middle of the month a British frigate arrived at Boston with another vessel under convoy. It was learned that a third vessel which had been with them had not arrived. Manley, who happened to be at Beverly, received this information from headquarters and immediately went to sea in search of the belated vessel. On the 29th he sighted a sail which proved to be the object of his search, the brigantine Nancy, which when overhauled surrendered without resistance and was taken into Gloucester. The Nancy carried a large cargo of ordnance and military stores which were of the utmost value to the American army. Besides other things there were two thousand muskets, thirty-one tons of musket shot, three thousand round shot, several barrels of powder, and a thirteen-inch brass mortar, which promised to be most useful in the siege of Boston. A few days later the mortar was "fixed on its bed before the Continental Laboratory [in Cambridge]. It is called The Congress, and is pronounced to be the noblest piece of ordnance ever landed in America." (N. E. Chronicle, December 7,1775.) Manley continued his cruise, and within a few days captured a three hundred ton ship called the Concord. A little later he took two other vessels and still another before the end of the year. On board one of these prizes were important letters of Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1537, 1721, 1722, iv, 168, 179, 180, 181, 214, 227, 314; Coll. Essex Institute, January, 1909; Boston Gazette, December 4, 25, 1775 ; Mass. Spy, December 15, 1775.)

In regard to the capture of the Nancy, Lord Sandwich, then at the head of the Admiralty, said: "The loss of the ordnance store ship is a fatal event, and by what Mr. Pringle tells me, has been most probably owing to the treachery of the master, who went out under convoy which he parted from on his passage and tho' a frigate on the coast of America, which he met at sea, took him under her protection, he parted from her also and continued to be beating backwards and forwards near the shore till he was picked up by the enemy's whaleboats." (Hist. Manuscripts Commission, Stopford-Sackville MS., 20.)

From the preceding narrative it appears that the close of the year 1775 found the Americans beginning in a resolute if somewhat feeble way to curtail in a slight measure the complete control of the sea held by their enemy. In a letter to Richard Henry Lee, dated November 27, before Manley's more notable successes, Washington sums up the situation in New England waters: "In answer to your inquiries respecting armed vessels, there are none of any tolerable force belonging to this Government. I know of but two of any kind; those very small." He doubtless alludes to the Machias Liberty and Diligent and to the provincial government of Massachusetts. "At the Continental expense I have fitted out six, two of which are upon the cruise directed by Congress; the rest ply about Capes Cod and Ann, as yet to very little purpose. These vessels are all manned by officers and soldiers, but how far, as they are upon the old establishment which has not more than a month to exist, they can be ordered off this station, I will not undertake to say; but suppose they might be engaged anew. Belonging to Providence there are two armed vessels, and I am told Connecticut has one." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1687.) As it was usual to call most armed vessels privateers, references to them in the newspapers and in correspondence cannot be relied on, but presumably some of those commissioned by Massachusetts had begun to cruise by the end of the year. Colonel Joseph Ward, writing to John Adams from the camp at Roxbury December 3, expresses his belief that naval enterprise on the part of the separate colonies will bring the best results (Adams MSS.)

On the 1st of January, 1776, Washington appointed Manley commodore of his fleet and he hoisted his pennant on board the schooner Hancock, which had just been added to the force. The terms of enlistment of the soldiers who had manned the vessels having just expired, new crews were recruited from the seafaring population along shore. All the vessels received new commanders. Daniel Waters took the Lee, Samuel Tucker the Franklin, Charles Dyar the Harrison, John Ayres the Lynch, and William Burke the Warren. The commissions and instructions of the first three of these captains were dated January 20; of the other two, February 1. The Washington, Captain Martindale, had been captured by the British frigate Fowey off Cape Ann in December, and taken into Boston (Coll. Essex Inst., January, 1909; Am. Arch., IV, iv, 257, 791, 793, 910; Sheppard's Life of Tucker, 31-35, 49, 50; Boston Gazette, January 1, 1776; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 485, December 15, 1775.)

In January, Manley took two prizes off Nantasket and was convoying them to Plymouth when he fell in with a British eight-gun schooner and had a brisk engagement in sight of the enemy's fleet in Nantasket Roads. The schooner sheered off and ran into Boston Harbor. Washington wrote to Manley, January 28: "I received your agreeable letter of the 26th instant giving an account of your having taken and carried into Plymouth two of the enemy's transports. Your conduct in engaging the eight-gun schooner with so few hands as you went out with, your attention in securing your prizes and your general good behavior since you first engaged in the service, merit my and your country's thanks." He goes on to suggest appointing stations for the different vessels, so as to give a better chance of intercepting the enemy's supplies, saying that the other captains, having been instructed to take orders from Manley, dared not disobey; "I wish you could inspire the captains of the other armed schooners under your command with some of your activity and industry." (Ford's Writings of Washington, iii, 382, 383.) A few days later Manley had another encounter with the enemy. As he was coming out of Plymouth January 30, an armed brig (which went from Boston for the purpose of taking him, as he supposed) gave him chase, upon which he ran his vessel on shore a little south of the North River in Scituate. The brig came to anchor and fired not less than four hundred times upon the privateer; but, very remarkable, no man was even wounded. One ball entered the stern and passed but about six inches from Captain Manly, who was confined by sickness in his cabin. The next day one hundred and thirty balls were found upon the adjacent shore. Besides the above, which is from a correspondent near where the affair happened, we hear that after the brig ceased firing she manned her boats, boarded Captain Manly's vessel (the people being ashore) and endeavoured to set her on fire; but seeing our people coming upon them, they were glad to get off without effecting their design. She has since been got off, is refitting and nearly ready for another cruise." (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 910 (letter from Cambridge, February 1, 1776) The Hancock took two prizes in March, one of which was armed and only surrendered after an engagement. The Lee and Franklin captured a large brigantine early in February and sent her into Gloucester (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 863, 883, 910, 936, v, 196, 834; Washington, iii, 382, 403; Tucker, 56; Coll. Essex Inst., January, 1909; Boston Gazette, January 22, 29, February 12, March 11, 18, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, February 1, 8, 1776.)

Meanwhile, during the occupation of Boston by the British, other vessels than those of Washington's fleet were cruising in Massachusetts Bay and to the eastward. In December the Rhode Island sloop Katy, Captain Whipple, captured one of the enemy's ships. The privateer Yankee Hero of Newburyport cruised in February and March with success. Among the prizes taken was "a large Ship from and own'd in London, laden with Coal, Cheese and Porter, bound for the Ministerial Assassins at Boston." February 26, 1776, fifteen prizes were advertised to be tried at Ipswich, and March 25, twelve others at Plymouth (Boston Gazette, December 11, 1775, January 22, February 19, 26, March 4, 18, 25, 1776; Mass. Spy, January 26, 1776.)

The great event of the month of March was heralded with a joy which found expression in somewhat extravagant language. On the 18th the evacuation of Boston was announced in the "Gazette," which was published at Watertown: "On Friday [March 15] it was reported they were plundering the town, breaking and destroying everything they could not carry away. And yesterday morning this last account was verified by the speedy and precipitate retreat of the whole of the Ministerial butchering, murdering and plundering Banditti of Lord North's mercenaries." March 22, Colonel Joseph Ward wrote to John Adams: "The 17th Inst. the Pirates all abandoned their Works in Boston & Charlestown & went on board their Ships, & on the 20th they burnt & destroyed the Works on Castle Island. They now lye in Nantasket Road waiting for a fair wind; we keep a vigilant eye over them lest they should make an attack on some unexpected quarter." (Boston Gazette, March 18,1776; Adams MSS.)

Soon after the evacuation Washington went to New York with the main army, leaving General Artemas Ward in command at Boston. The fleet then passed under Ward's orders. Captain Manley was appointed to command one of the new frigates authorized by Congress in December, 1775, and gave up the schooner Hancock to Captain Tucker; and the Franklin was commanded for a short time by James Mugford of Marblehead. The Hancock on May 7 captured two brigs off Boston Harbor in sight of two or three British men-of-war at anchor, which had remained after the evacuation. The prizes were taken into Lynn (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 396; N. E. Chronicle, May 9, 1776; Boston Gazette, May 13, 1776.)

On May 17 the Franklin captured the ship Hope with a large cargo of military stores including seventy-five tons of powder. Mugford took his prize into Boston, running by the British fleet in the harbor. "The enemy on board the men of war below, intolerably vexed and chagrined that the above ship should be taken and unloaded in their open view, formed a design of wreaking their vengeance on the gallant Capt. Mugford, who took her. The Sunday following [May 19] Capt. Mugford, in company with Capt. Cunningham in the Lady Washington, a small privateer armed with swivels, blunderbusses and muskets, fell down in order to go out in the bay. The enemy observed their sailing and fitted out a fleet of boats for the purpose of surprizing and taking them in the night; and the Franklin's running aground in the Gut gave them a good opportunity for executing their plan. The Lady Washington came to anchor near capt. Mugford, and between 9 and 10 o'clock he discovered a number of boats which he hailed and received for answer, that they were from Boston. He ordered them to keep off, or he would fire upon them. They begged him for God's sake not to fire, for they were going on board him. Capt. Mugford instantly fired and was followed by all his men, and cutting his cable bro't his broadside to bear, when be discharged his cannon loaded with musket ball directly in upon them. Before the cannon could be charged a second time, 2 or 3 boats were alongside, each of them supposed to have as many men on board as the Franklin, which were only 21, including officers. By the best accounts there were not less than 13 boats in all, many of them armed with swivels and having on board, at the lowest computation, 200 men. Capt. Mugford and his men plied those alongside so closely with fire arms and spears and with such intrepidity, activity and success, that two boats were soon sunk and all the men either killed or drowned. But while the heroic Mugford, with outstretched arms, was righteously dealing death and destruction to our base and unnatural enemies, he received a fatal ball in his body, which in a few minutes put a period to a life, from which, had it been spared, his oppressed country would undoubtedly have reaped very eminent advantages. After our brave men had maintained this unequal contest for about half an hour, the enemy thought proper to retire. The carnage among them must have been great, for besides the two boat loads killed and drowned many were doubtless killed and wounded on board the others. Great execution was done by the spears. One man with that weapon is positive of having killed nine of the enemy. The number of boats which attacked the Franklin was about 8 or 9. The remainder, to the number of 4 or 5, at the same time attacked Capt. Cunningham in the Lady Washington, who then had on board only 6 men besides himself. This brave little company gave the boats such a warm reception that the enemy were soon glad to give over the contest, after suffering, it is thought, considerable loss." (Boston Gazette, May 20, 27, 1776; Am- Arch., IV, vi, 495, 496.)

General Ward's report of May 20 differs somewhat from the above as to the manner of Mugford's death. He says: "Captain Mugford was very fiercely attacked by twelve or thirteen boats full of men, but he and his men exerted themselves with remarkable bravery, beat off the enemy, sunk several of their boats, and killed a number of their men; it is supposed they lost sixty or seventy. The intrepid Captain Mugford fell a little before the enemy left his schooner; he was ran through with a lance while he was cutting off the hands of the pirates as they were attempting to board him, and it is said that with his own hands he cut off five pairs of theirs. No other man was killed or wounded on board the Franklin . . . Mr. Mugford was not commissioned Captain of the Franklin, but Master; and as the other officers had left the schooner, he took command." A week later Ward gave further details as to the part taken by the Lady Washington: "The Franklin had twenty-one men, officers included; the Lady Washington had seven, Captain Cunningham commander. She was attacked by five boats, which were supposed to contain near or quite a hundred men; but after repeated efforts to board her they were beaten off by the intrepidity and exertions of the little company, who gloriously defended the Lady against the brutal ravishers of liberty." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 532, 602.)

In regard to the Franklin's prize, General Howe wrote from Halifax, June 7, to Lord George Germain: "It is with concern I am to advise your lordship of another ordnance store ship, named the Hope, being taken in Boston Bay. She had a large proportion of entrenching tools on board and, it is said, 1500 barrels of powder. I understand the master was suspected of treachery before the ship left England and that Captain Dickson, commanding the Greyhound, gave information of the suspicion to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, sometime before she sailed under his convoy." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 35.)

Many transports sailed from England for America in the spring of 1776. It was reported by a shipmaster lately arrived from France that a fleet of about forty with five thousand troops on board had sailed from Plymouth March 10 (Adams MSS., April 30,1776.) Another fleet of thirty-three troopships conveying three thousand Highlanders sailed from Scotland for Boston before news of the evacuation of the town reached England. Some of them arrived while the British fleet was still in the harbor and were able to join it. One of them, however, early in June was so unfortunate as to fall in with the schooners Lee, Captain Waters, and Warren, Captain Burke, and was captured and taken safely into port. She had about a hundred soldiers on board (Papers of Cont. Congress, 152, 2, 45; Boston Gazette, June 10, 1776.)

In a letter to Washington dated June 16, 1776, General Ward gives an account of the measures taken to make complete the evacuation of Boston. He says: "The thirteenth Instant at evening I ordered five Hundred men with proper officers, a detachment of the Train with a thirteen Inch Mortar, two Eighteen pounders and some small Cannon, under the Command of Colo. Whitcomb, to take post on Long Island to annoy the Enemys Ships; the necessary works were thrown up in the night and the next morning our Cannon and Mortar began to play upon the pirates, which soon drove them all out of the harbour. The Fleet consisted of thirteen in number, the Renown of fifty Guns, several smaller ships of War and some transports with Highlanders on board; as near as we could judge there were about eight hundred Troops on board the Transports. They blew up the Light house as they went off and then put to sea with their Fleet. I think it probable they will leave some Frigates to cruize in the bay. A number of the Colony troops and militia were to have thrown up some works the same night on Petticks Island and Nantasket head, but by some unfortunate obstructions they did not get their Canon ready in time; however, they gave the Enemy a number of Shot as the Ships passed through the Channel. Our shot cut away some of their yards and rigging and several sent into the ships sides, but the Shells from the Mortar terryfied them most; they returned a fierce shot from the Commodores ship without any effect and got under sail with all expedition." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 2, 99.) An officer of the militia, sent to Nantasket Head, says that, after great and unavoidable delay, guns were mounted on Quaker Hill. The fleet had already dropped down and anchored opposite the lighthouse. "The Commodore lay foremost and after firing the second shot he blew up the Light-House, and at the fourth round the whole fleet got under way a second time. Some of our shot we have no doubt struck him, as all the boats in the fleet were sent to tow him off. He fired but one shot, but we pelted him till out of reach of our cannon." (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 946.) The British fleet, commanded by Commodore Banks, consisted of eight ships, two snows, two brigs, and a schooner. The Renown, with two other men-of-war and twelve transports, arrived at Halifax July 6 (Ibid., 917, 931, 945; Almon, iii, 201, 235, 236; Boston Gazette, June 17,1776; Continental Journal, June 20,1776; Adams MSS., June 16, 1776.)

It is probable that some of the fleet of Scotch transports bound to Boston were intercepted by Commodore Banks and taken into Halifax with him; several of these ships got safely into that place eventually. But June 16, only two days after the last British vessel had been driven out of Boston Harbor, two of these transports unsuspiciously approached the port. The officer of militia stationed at Nantasket gives an account of what passed under his notice, as the vessels came within view of that point, saying: "On Sunday afternoon we saw a ship and a brigantine standing in for the Light House channel, chased and fired upon by four privateers." One of these seems to have been the schooner Warren, Captain Burke, of Washington's fleet. The combatants "frequently exchanged broadsides. We, supposing them to be part of the Scotch fleet, got every man to his quarters and carried one eighteen-pounder to Point Alderton on purpose to hinder their retreat should they get into the road, opposite where we had three eighteen pounders. About five o'clock the privateers left them and stood for the southward, when the ship and brig crowded all their sail for the channel. Our orders were not to fire till the last [the brig] got abreast of us. In tacking, she got aground just under our cannon, when we hailed her to strike to this Colony; they refused and we flred one eighteen-pounder loaded with round and canister shot, when she struck and cried out for quarters. We ordered the boat and Captain on shore and then fired at the ship, but being quite dark, we supposed she had struck. By this time the privateers came up. A Captain of the Highlanders in the brigantine's boat came on shore. Some time after, the ship got under way and stood for the Narrows, when a fine privateer brigantine [the Defence of the Connecticut navy], commanded by Captain Harding of New Haven, . . . and five schooners gave chase. The brig came alongside, when a hot engagement ensued, which lasted three quarters of an hour, when the ship struck. The brigantine floating, took advantage of the confusion and attempted to follow, both supposing the enemy in possession of Boston." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 946; Continental Journal, June 20, 1776. )

The Defence had sailed from Plymouth in the morning. One of her lieutenants, Samuel Smedley, says that firing was heard in the direction of Boston. It was foggy, but cleared in the afternoon and the vessels in action were then seen. On account of light wind it was sunset before the Defence came up with the schooners, which were then making off, and learned that the strangers were transports. "We made the best of our way towards them and at eleven at night found them at anchor a small distance above where the Light-House formerly stood. We likewise ran close to them and anchored. Hailed them from whence they came. They answered from England. Captain Harding ordered them immediately to strike. They, like brave soldiers, refused and immediately a very heavy fire began and at the end of near two hours we made them surrender." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 1127.) According to this statement the Defence captured the transports without any help from the schooners, which Smedley accuses of cowardice and thinks should not share in the prizes. General Ward in his report says "that the Continental Privatiers have taken and brought into Nantasket in this Harbour a Ship and a Brig from Glasgow with two hundred and ten Highlanders on board." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 2, 99.) The losses are variously stated, the lowest for the Americans being three wounded, one of them mortally; for the British, four killed including a major, and eight or ten wounded. Two days later another vessel was taken, with one hundred and twelve Highlanders, but whether by privateers or by Washington's fleet is not clear. There were now over four hundred soldiers, taken on transports, confined in the vicinity of Boston. It was reported that at just about the same time two more of these Scotch transports were taken by a Rhode Island privateer and sent into Dartmouth (New Bedford), and two others were captured by the Continental brig Andrew Doria (Continental Journal, June 20, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, June 20, July 4,1776; Boston Gazette, June 24, July 15, 1776; Letters of John and Abigail Adams, 95, 96; Tucker, 57-60; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 36; See ch. 6.)

The capture of their transports was disturbing to the British authorities, and the Admiralty called upon Admiral Howe, who in 1776 relieved Admiral Shuldham in command of the North American station, for an investigation, to which he replied in February, 1777. In this report was inclosed a letter written by Shuldham in February, 1776, in which, referring to the earlier captures made by Washington's fleet, he had suggested "that all Supplies to this Country might be sent in Armed Vessels, I mean such as our Old Forty Gun Ships with only their upper Tier of Guns, for however numerous our Cruizers may be or however attentive our Officers to their Duty, it has been found impossible to prevent some of our Ordnance and other valuable Stores, in small Vessels, falling into the hands of the Rebels, and here I must take occasion to say that in the course of my Service I never found Officers perform their Duty with so much perseverance and Vigilance as ours on this important Service; indeed the firmness with which they have resisted the rigor of this long and severe Winter in constantly keeping the Sea on their respective Stations is unprecedented and incredible. At the same time I must beg leave to observe to you the very few Ships I am provided with to enable me to co-operate with the Army, Cruize off the Ports of the Rebels to prevent their receiving Supplies, or protect those destined to this place from falling into their hands." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, February 26, 1776.) Howe's inquiries brought out the fact that Shuldham in March, 1776, had detailed seven small cruisers to remain with Commodore Banks in Boston Harbor, in order to insure the safety of such transports as might arrive after the departure for Halifax of the main body of the British. Other service, however, prevented these vessels from being on hand when needed. The frigate Milford and two or three smaller vessels, with the Renown, made up the whole available force for the protection of the transports. Howe added that "respecting the Use that has been made of the Harbour of Boston as an Asylum for the Rebel Cruizers and their Prizes, their Lordships knowing the Nature and Circumstances of the Port will be apprised of the Impossibility to prevent an Enemy from profiting greatly by the Advantages of such a Situation." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, No. 24, February 20, 1777.)

The vessels of Washington's fleet continued to cruise in Massachusetts Bay during the whole of the year 1776. Captain Tucker in the Hancock and Captain Skimmer, who had taken Mugford's place in the Franklin, captured the armed ship Peggy and two brigs in July. Tucker is said to have taken thirty or forty prizes in all, of which the last was brought into port in December and furnished the army with much-needed clothing. The operations of the fleet and of other American armed vessels were a good deal hampered by British cruisers in Massachusetts Bay. John Adams learned from a correspondent that "Our Bay is infested with 3 or 4 frigates which have retaken some valuable Prizes and interrupt our coasting trade." (Adams MS., September 17,1776.) It was recorded in a newspaper that "Monday and Tuesday last the British Tyrant Frigate Milford was seen in our Bay, and to have two Schooners and a Sloop as Prizes. She has taken the Continental Privateer Warren, Capt. Burk, and is continually cruizing between Cape-Cod and Cape-Ann, that we apprehend she will intercept all our Trade. 'Tis hoped that some of our American Frigates win come this Way and rid our Coast of this inhuman Plunderer." (Continental Journal, September 5, 1776; Am. Arch., V, ii, 116.) The Warren is believed to have been the only one of Washington's fleet to be captured, except the brigantine Washington taken in December, 1775. Early in the year 1777 the fleet was broken up by order of the Marine Committee; the Lee, however, continued to cruise several months longer. The vessels were disposed of as they were put out of commission, and some of the officers were taken into the Continental navy (Ibid,, i, 662, iii, 685, 799; Tucker, 61-65; Boston Gazette, July 8, August 5, September 9, 1776; Marine Committee Letter Book, 59, 62, 114 (February 7, March 21, November 22, 1777)

Upon his arrival in New York in April, 1776, General Washington began to fit out another but much smaller fleet for the defense of the neighboring waters. He was aided by the cooperation of the New York Committee of Safety. Two sloops, the General Schuyler and the General Mifflin, were fitted out. Other vessels, wholly or partly under Washington's control or under the New York Committee, were the schooner General Putnam, the sloop Montgomery and the galleys Lady Washington, Washington, and Spitfire. The galleys were used in the defense of the Hudson and the two last named came from Rhode Island. The larger vessels cruised, mostly about Long Island and along the New Jersey shore, with some success. In June one of the transports which had been captured by the Andrew Doria, as has just been related, was retaken by the British frigate Cerberus and was then taken again by the General Schuyler, under the command of Lieutenant Joseph Davison. In the same month the Schuyler, cruising in company with the Montgomery, recaptured four prizes of the British frigate Greyhound (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 410, 545, 563, 564, V, i, 141; N. E. Chronicle, July 4,1775; Washington, iv, 167, 318; Jour. N.Y. Prov. Congr., i, 416; R.I. Colonial Rec., vii, 582; Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 2, 131 (Davison to Washington, June 27, 1776)

On August 3, Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Tupper reported to General Washington the operations of a flotilla of five galleys on the Hudson: "I am now to inform your Excellency that my flag being hoisted on board of the Washington, I came up with the Ships [Phoenix and Rose] & attacked at 1/4 past One this Afternoon. The Phoenix fired the first Gun, which was return'd by the Lady Washington, whose Shot went thro the Phoenix. Upon my Orders the Lady Washington put about to form a Line; the tide was such that the Washington & Spitfire was exposed to the Broad Sides of the Ships for 1/2 of an hour without Suffering mutch Damage. We engaged them an hour & a half and then we thought to retreat to Dobb's Ferry about 4 miles below the Ships." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 2, 337 (Tupper to Washington, August 3, 1776); Am. Arch., V, i, 766.) The Americans lost one killed and thirteen wounded, one of them mortally.

Another account says that the Washington "came within grape shot of the ships and sustained their whole fire for a quarter of an hour before the other ships could come up, the Lady Washington falling into the line according to orders. The Spitfire advanced to the assistance of the Washington and behaved well. We had as hot a fire as perhaps ever was known for an hour and a half. The W